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The problem considered in this symposium is as old, nearly, as
the antitrust laws and as current as pending decisions of the Su-
preme Court.' The problem is how and whether to apply our laws
regulating competition, the antitrust laws, to the joint conduct of
workers or of employers with respect to workers. Much of this
. Partner, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. The Supreme Court first applied the Sherman Act to labor activities in 1908. Loewe
v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (the "Danbury Hatters" case). At the time of this writing
(October 1982), the Supreme Court has one labor/antitrust case pending before it. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters v. Ass'n Gen. Contractors of Cal., 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982). It has just denied certiorari in two other such cases. Larry V.
Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir.
1979), on remand, 670 F.2d 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 229-30 (1982); Mid-
America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 881
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 132-33 (1982). One such case is pending in the Court
on petition for writ of certiorari. James Snyder Co. v. Associated General Contractors, 677
F.2d 1111 (6th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3175-76 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1982)
(No. 82-148). A comprehensive table of cases and bibliography of articles relating to labor/
antitrust issues was prepared and distributed to participants in the seminar on which this
symposium is based. Copies are on file with the Allegheny County Bar Association, Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania.
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conduct is addressed in our labor laws.
The fundamental source of the problem is not hard to find for
anyone trained in economics. Our labor laws promote and en-
courage what our antitrust laws forbid: cartels, or agreements to fix
prices and control production levels.
Agreements to fix prices for an economically significant factor of
production are the essence of unionism. Collective bargaining, by
which workers and employers through multi-employer or parallel
bargaining can equalize wage rates throughout an industry, is the
cornerstone of this country's labor policy. The labor laws permit
workers to join together to fix wage rates, and permit employers to
join together to bargain with workers over wage rates.
This is contrary to the fundamental premises on which antitrust
lawyers work. For example, the antitrust laws would forbid mine
operators from fixing the price to steel companies of iron ore, and
would forbid steel companies from joining together to agree what
they will pay to mine operators for iron ore. Although few would
dispute that labor is as significant a factor in the production of
steel as is iron ore or that steel prices are affected by labor costs as
well as iron ore costs, our national policy is to tolerate, indeed to
encourage, agreements concerning labor that we would not tolerate
regarding any other factor of production.
This underlying conflict between labor and antitrust policy is
not always recognized. I am confident Mr. Winpisinger, the presi-
dent of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (IAM), saw no irony in his filing of an antitrust complaint
charging OPEC nations with fixing the price of oil and causing an
increase in gasoline prices.2 I am sure he felt a great injustice had
been done when, on grounds relating to foreign policy, the dismis-
sal of his complaint was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Doubtless
he would see only justice were a court similarly to throw out, on
grounds relating to national labor policy, a complaint by consum-
ers that the IAM had raised the price of air fares by increasing the
labor cost of the airlines.
Recognizing the fundamental source of the difficulty in recon-
ciling labor and antitrust policy is only the first step in under-
standing the problem, however. This is because, speaking as an an-
titrust lawyer, labor law is an extraordinarily complicated field.
2. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp.




Those whose daily practice is labor law doubtless feel that the
same is true about antitrust. Also, there is an endless variety of
situations in which labor and antitrust issues can arise.
The following papers identify some of the general rules that
Congress and the courts have developed and imposed upon this
complicated area. They also discuss a good number of the specific
and recurring situations in which a concrete resolution of the con-
flict between labor and antitrust law and policy has been and is
necessary.
The Supreme Court and Congress have undertaken many times
in this century to resolve this conflict. None of the papers here
repeat the entire history - that history is set out ably in a number
of places by the Supreme Court and by commentators.3
It will suffice to say that Congress has several times "corrected"
Supreme Court decisions that seemed to tip the balance of anti-
trust law and labor policy in favor of antitrust.4 My own view is
that currently the balance once again is tipped decidedly in favor
of antitrust concerns. It seems to me the Supreme court has con-
cluded that, in the gray areas where labor law does not clearly ap-
prove an activity or practice, less weight is and will be given to
concerns about inhibiting collective bargaining or other favored la-
bor activities, than to concerns about limiting competition among
employers or increasing prices to consumers.
If the labor/antitrust problem has been with us for ninety years,
it is fair to ask why we are having a symposium about it now. The
simple answer is that more is happening today in this field than
ever before. A large part of the reason for this is that the Supreme
Court's decision in 1975 in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local 100 has been perceived as expanding the
area in which antitrust laws may apply to labor-related activities.
It is very difficult to measure precisely the increased litigation
activity in labor/antitrust. There may be anecdotal evidence in the
fact that most labor lawyers never worried until recently about the
problem, and that more than a few practitioners now find labor/
3. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bar-
gaining, and The Antitrust Laws, 6 J.L. & EcON. 152, 154-58 (1963); see also P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 188-222 (1978).
4. See Booker & Leech, A Sketch of Antitrust Laws Applied in Labor Contexts, Alle-
gheny County Bar Ass'n Seminar on the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Labor-Related
Activities (June 22, 1982) (to be published in ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEvELOPMENS (SECOND)
(1983)).
5. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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antitrust counseling questions arising regularly.6
One more concrete indication we have is reported cases, which
LEXIS permits one quickly to search. Doing so indicates that dis-
cussion of labor/antitrust exemption issues has increased mark-
edly. For example, in the ten years before the Supreme Court's
1965 decisions in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea and United Mine Workers v. Pennington,7 two important la-
bor/antitrust cases, there were twenty-one federal court opinions
that concerned these types of issues. In the following ten years
(until the Supreme Court decision in Connell), there were sixty-
seven such opinions. In just the seven years since Connell, 127
opinions have addressed labor/antitrust issues.
Labor/antitrust opinions thus have increased in frequency since
the decade 1965-75 at a rate of 270%, while the number of opin-
ions in all federal cases (according to LEXIS) has increased since
that decade by only 140%. Several federal courts of appeals have
within the year issued labor/antitrust opinions.' The Supreme
Court has considered labor/antitrust cases several times recently 9
and currently has before it a labor/antitrust case - California
State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors of
California.0
By way of a further and final introduction to the subject of this
symposium, let me mention a few thoughts to keep in mind and a
few questions to which you might expect answers in the following
papers. First, if conduct is specifically addressed by the labor laws
and is legal under the labor laws, there will be no antitrust expo-
sure for engaging in that conduct. This is acutely important, be-
cause it would be a mistake to assume that every action of a union
or of employers dealing with a union raises antitrust issues. There
is a great portion of what unions and employers regularly do that
is not affected by antitrust.
Of course, what unions and employers do is not always legal
under the labor laws. Any antitrust prosecutor will tell you that
most government sanctioned cartels eventually, in some way and
6. See, e.g., Legal Times, July 5, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
7. 381 U.S. 676 (1965); 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
8. See supra note 1; National Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. National Contractors Ass'n,
678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982); Swanson-Dean Corp. v. Seattle Dist. Council of Carpenters,
646 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2903 (1982).
9. See supra note 1; H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704
(1981).
10. 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
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to some degree, exceed the scope of their government sanction.
Thus, we need to reach my other thoughts.
Second, if conduct is specifically addressed by labor law, involves
an employer in some way and is illegal, or if conduct is not specifi-
cally addressed by the labor laws, it is likely to be subject to anti-
trust scrutiny. Just what type of antitrust scrutiny, and the conclu-
sion a court will reach as to antitrust illegality, will depend on the
facts of the particular case. It would be a mistake to assume that
because the labor exemption from antitrust liability does not ap-
ply, the conduct is illegal under the antitrust laws. Rather, there is
at least a two step inquiry. Does the labor exemption apply? And if
not, was the conduct illegal under the antitrust laws?
Third, it is my impression that labor lawyers and antitrust law-
yers have not sought to understand each other's fields. I doubt that
any antitrust compliance program of a major corporation in this
country (each one designed by antitrust lawyers) seriously ad-
dresses the need for labor relations executives (and labor lawyers)
to be familiar with antitrust danger points in labor relations. On
the other side, I doubt that many labor lawyers fully appreciate
the full consequences of the policies upon which antitrust law is
based.
Fourth, it occurs to me that the lower courts are uncomfortable
with the present balance in favor of antitrust and that, in conse-
quence, some unusual things are happening to antitrust law. Just
one example is the suggestion of the Third Circuit in the Consoli-
dated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Association1 case
which held that a rule of per se antitrust illegality would apply to a
boycott of non-International Longshoremen's Association employ-
ers. The "suggestion" to which I allude was that treble damages
might not be available to the boycotted employers. The Third Cir-
cuit felt compelled to conclude, in a holding unprecedented to my
knowledge, that the trebling of damages, which by the statutory
terms seems to be mandatory and which in common understanding
is mandatory once an antitrust violation is established by an in-
jured party, may in fact not be available if the antitrust illegality
of the union's conduct was unforeseeable.
So much for my thoughts. I raise them tentatively and with
some expectation of contradiction by other following papers. How-
11. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 902, on remand, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1980), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. In re Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 451
U.S. 905 (1981).
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ever, I hope they provide you with reference points as you read the
other papers.
As a concluding note, the symposium outline may impose more
structure on this field than in fact there is. We hope, however, that
this structure will give you some bearings in understanding the
problem and a common sense start in finding the answer to a cli-
ent's questions or an oppponent's argument.
